Perspectives on the Atonement: seeking an agreed way forward
KNOWLEDGE is furthered by disagreement; but how that disagreement is expressed is crucial. Both ordained for the province of Armagh in 2012, but with contrasting perspectives, two Church of Ireland clerics engage with one another below on one of the most hotly debated topics in the Church today: that regarding nonviolent and cross- centered theories of atonement. Andrew Campbell: WHEN we look across the spectrum of western theological discourse over the early years of this century we see that the nature of atonement is a dominant subject for debate. Behind much of this debate is rejection of violence (namely the cross) as a means by which atonement is won. Over the last years of the 20th century and the early 21st century thinkers such as Rebecca Ann Parker, Rita Brock, Rosemary Radford Ruether and J. Denney Weaver have highlighted their problems with cross-centred atonement theologies. (By ‘cross-centred’ I refer to any view of the atonement in which the death of Christ is divinely ordained.) These nonviolent theorists reject the idea that atonement was achieved through a violent act perpetrated against Christ, leading to the now infamous claim that “divine child-abuse is paraded as salvific.”1 This has given rise to nonviolent atonement theologies that deny that the death of Christ was divinely ordained.
This shift away from atonement thinking centred on the cross can be traced to an ethical concern for those vulnerable to violence, due to its use to support violent and oppressive behaviour.2 In light of these ethical concerns many of the nonviolent theorists in question offer variations of an atonement theology that rejects the notion of divine wrath being responsible for Christ’s death on the cross, focusing rather on this world and the need for ethical behavior. Despite their apparent appeal, these models of nonviolent atonement theology fail to stand up to hermeneutic, historical or theological criticism. Yet the concerns raised by these theorists are valid, so we need to look at the merits of nonviolent atonement theology and how these relate to cross-centred models of the atonement.Rob Clements:
ONE of the gifts of ‘practical theology’ is that no doctrine gets a ‘free pass’ without being subject to the valid question: How does this affect the way we behave? Every idea has an outcome. Ideas that seem to be coherent philosophically often turn out to be tyrannical in practice. This is one of the reasons for nonviolent critiques of cross-centered views of atonement. Once we give moral grounding to the idea that violence can be redemptive through the cross, we open ourselves to the possibility that violence can be redemptive in other spheres. What does this idea mean for foreign policy, for the criminal justice system, for violence in the home or in schools? The idea that God’s wrath needs to be satisfied by the killing of the innocent - (forgive this rather brutal caricature of substitutionary atonement) - is a problematic if not toxic idea, which may encourage widespread scapegoating. Those who advocate for nonviolent atonement models are not without their own problems regarding ethical praxis. If the outcome of substitutionary atonement is an excessively disciplinarian view of the world, it can also be argued that nonviolent models produce an overly lenient world-view, in which wrongdoing is overlooked and justice sacrificed. It is true to note, as Andrew does, that ethics is central to nonviolent models of atonement. However, they also offer a theological corrective. The trouble with more traditional cross-centred thinking is that it risks over-emphasising the crucifixion to the point that the resurrection becomes merely theatre. If salvation is achieved solely through the cross, is there anything salvific in the resurrection? Nonviolent atonement models argue that the death of Jesus was neither directed or necessitated by God, but that it was the outcome of the worldly powers’ attempt to annihilate the reign of God as seen in Christ. The truly salvific moment is not in his death, but in his victory over death. Rather than the death of Jesus, what the sinner needs most is the resurrection of the Christ. I take Andrew’s point that nonviolent atonement theologies fail to stand up to hermeneutic, historical or theological criticism – to some extent. I can hear in my mind Paul’s words, “I preach Christ crucified”. But Paul also preached, “If Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile and you are still in your sins”(I.Cor:15.17). So I’m not sure that traditional cross-centered theories of atonement fare any better.Andrew Campbell:
ROB raises some very valid points that I think we must explore. The first of these is the problem of ideas that are coherent philosophically proving tyrannical in practice. However, this is not necessarily so. In several cases an idea can be misused in oppressive ways. For example the language of love has been used to sustain abusive relationships, yet this does not mean that love is linked to abuse. What we would agree is that abuse in the context of ‘love’ is a perversion that requires correction, not an abandonment of love. I would suggest that the very real example of the use of cross-centred atonement theology for oppressive ends falls into this same category, so that what is required is not an abandonment of the cross as proposed by the nonviolent theorists but a re-appropriation of cross-centred atonement theologies, seeking to take on board the threat of abuse. Rob correctly highlights the dangers of nonviolent atonement theology for issues of justice. The danger is acute for oppressed societies where any hopes of justice ‘in this world’ will never materialise. The entertainment of any idea that injustice can be overlooked is the mark of a privileged society, and if we are to be global in our theology, and take seriously the need to stand with the oppressed, then we must promote a theology that includes justice in the response to wrongdoing. This takes us to the caricature presented by nonviolent theorists of the need for God’s wrath (which for the proposes of this paper we define simply as holding wrongdoing to account) to be satisfied by the death of an innocent third party, an exaggeration that Rob helpfully names. As with all caricatures it over-emphasises particular aspects of the theory while minimising others. In this case the role of incarnational and trinitarian theology is ignored. Historically both these have fed into atonement theology. The impact of the incarnation in this case is that the Christ takes on the nature of the wrongdoer/s and in dying on the cross takes upon himself the destructive consequences of their sin. In this way the wrongdoing is held to account without the destruction of wrongdoer/s. As Miroslav Volf observes:Christ’s death doesn’t replace our death. It enacts it... Now we see that we were also in Christ. What happened to him happened to us. When he was condemned, we were condemned. When he died, we died.Trinitarian theology also has to come into play as atonement must be seen within the framework of the Trinity, as God working within himself in order to hold wrongdoing to account while lovingly sparing the humanity he loves from the consequences of that wrongdoing. It is important to note that this is but one aspect, albeit an important one, of the symphony of the atonement.
Violence and morality
There is an important issue regarding violence in traditional atonement theologies that Rob has raised; and this takes me to an important aside. Nonviolent theorists and indeed our western culture present violence as abhorrent in all its manifestations. But violence is a wide-reaching phenomenon and I would ask: is violence always negative? To answer that it is important to step back for a moment. For example, food production is violent. This is obvious in the abattoir, but can also be the case with vegetables in which the premature death of the plant is required. Violence exists in both cases even though aggression is not present, so the violence does not incur moral judgment and can be deemed morally neutral. I would therefore suggest that if we take a step back we see that violence is not intrinsically evil in and of itself, although it is often a tool for evil. Having accepted that there is such a thing as morally neutral violence, I would argue that it no longer becomes problematic for God to be involved in it for salvific purposes. Rob and I agree that many current presentations of ‘traditional’ forms of atonement theology are inadequate, but I would suggest that there are many historical approaches that do offer ethical atonement. This is an area in which we can learn from nonviolent atonement theories. We need to ask how can cross-centred atonement theories give rise to ethical behaviour?Kenosis
One way forward I believe is kenotic theology (the self-emptying of Christ) as it offers an “as Christ – so we’” structure to cross-centred models of atonement, providing an ethic of self-giving. Christ gives of himself for a helpless and powerless humanity, so the Christian disciple enters into an ethic of self-donation for others. Philippians 2:4-11 displays an ”as Christ – so we” connection between the death of Christ and Christian ethics, as St Paul calls for Christ’s example of self-emptying and self-giving to be followed wholeheartedly by members of the Church. This is not to advocate that they suffer crucifixion, but simply that they employ the same attitude as Christ, an attitude that does not stand upon status, but rather gives of the self for the sake of others. What is important for our discussion here is Paul’s clear promotion of an attitude of self-giving. Nonviolent atonement theology has reminded us of the need for integration of doctrine and ethics and I would propose that kenotic theology offers one way forward within atonement theology centred on the cross.Rob Clements:
I THINK Andrew’s reluctance to abandon the centrality of the cross in atonement theology because of its occasional misappropriation is valid. It might be fair to say that one of the vices of modern theology is a haste to reject concepts without fully exploring their theological implications. But a question worth investigating is whether that misappropriation is linguistically and morally embedded in a traditional theology of the cross, or a perversion of it. For the benefit of our current discussion, I am happy to concede the latter. I think Andrew is also fair in noting some of the weaknesses in nonviolent atonement thinking. I agree that the image of ‘the divine child-abuser’ is less apt if we take seriously the nature of the Trinity. I think it is also true that nonviolent atonement theory does not adequately address the consequence of wrongdoing. However I’m not entirely in agreement with Andrew’s interpretation of the phenomenon of violence. The concept of violence can be stretched to become all-encompassing. One could make a casethat the very act of creation is violent, since chaos can only become order through coercion. For me this stretches The the elasticity of what we mean by violence too far. By its most basic definition, violence is the intentional surrender of imposition of suffering from one being to another self-interest for by use of physical or psychic force. With respect to such violence, there can be no such a thing as moral neutrality. Even on occasions when one might judge violence to be necessary - for example for the prevention of further violence - I would argue that it was morally regrettable, not morally neutral. Can God participate in something that is morally regrettable, even if it is for the sake of some greater good? That being said, I find Andrew’s use of kenotic theology helpful, and a potential basis for common ground on this issue. The “as Christ – so we” ethic of Philippians 2 is a strong injunction towards the giving of the self for the sake of the other. A criticism of much traditional atonement theology is that it over-emphasises the place of individual salvation at the expense of the transformation of social structures. “As Christ – so we” goes some way to address this; but of course, this idea needs to be tested. A woman who has been told that she should give herself over to suffering for the satisfaction of her abusive husband may see problems, for instance! The surrendering of the will, of self-interest, which as far as I can see is the psychological basis of kenotic theology, is a foundational mark of nonviolence. The will to be violent is the sin that lurks at the door waiting to devour us. The first thing Cain does when he lets it in, is murder his brother. The surrender of self-interest for the sake of the other is the very basis of Christ’s death on the cross. That it may be understood as a foundational mark of cross-centred atonement theology offers a helpful way forward. Perhaps nonviolent and cross-centred theologies of atonement come at this from different angles. We may still debate whose will Christ is surrendering to. Despite Jesus’ “not my will but thine be done” in Gethsemane, proponents of nonviolent atonement will not concede that the crucifixion was the will of the Father. Possibly the answer is lost in the mystery of the Trinity, but the idea of self-surrender does offer some grounding for a common ethic of action.Andrew Campbell:
ROB has helpfully defined violence for our discussion, and his identification of a category of ‘morally regrettable’ is useful, being a helpful term in cases of moral ambiguity. However I would apply this language to the motivation for violence rather than the violence itself; so I would still argue for the retention of the language of ‘moral neutrality’. In the examples that I mentioned in relation to food, death is imposed upon a vegetable or fruit as it is eaten yet this receives no moral judgment. Similarly, in the natural world of tooth and claw we attach no moral judgment to the lion that kills his prey, or the mole that eats worms or grubs. Equally in the medical world, few would describe the doctor who seeks to kill cancerous cells as ‘morally regrettable’. With a view to such cases I would suggest that it is the motivation to violence that can be evil, rather than the violence itself. However nonviolent atonement theology is founded on the view that violence is intrinsically evil, a moral ground which I hope I have shown to be ambiguous. That said, I agree with Rob regarding the dangers of individualism and the possible abuse of kenotic theology. I believe a second lesson can be learnt from nonviolent atonement theorists’ presentation of salvation in socio-political terms. Salvation within nonviolent models is found in Christ-shaped redemptive communities. Such redemptive communities are marked by gender, ethnic and economic justice. This emphasis on ecclesial existence is an important insight from which we can glean much. A corporate understanding of objective cross-centred atonement is not without precedent. P.T. Forsyth, one of the great theologians of such atonement theology, argues in The Work of Christ not only for individual but also for corporate salvation through the work of Christ on the cross. What is more, he sees such corporate bodies as working for justice within the wider society.Called to mutual self-giving
When we read kenotic theology with reference to the communal existence of the Church we are called to mutual and reciprocal self-giving. By highlighting the need for cross-centred atonement theories to be understood within the context of ecclesial existence, we put the kenotic ethics of the cross into a communal context. Applying it to the whole church community, the powerful and the powerless alike, George Lindbeck stresses the need for both a corporate application and an ethical outworking of doctrine. According to Lindbeck, such an application adds weight to Christian truth claims, and he observes that: “The proclamation of the gospel, as a Christian would put it, may be first of all the telling of the story, but this gains power and meaning insofar as it is embodied in the total gestalt of community life and action.” Returning to Rob’s point about the possible abuse of self-giving ethics, I’d contend that understanding kenotic theology within communal existence offers at least some protection if, forgoing privilege and power, we uphold the needs of the other in a spirit of self-giving. I acknowledge that this still opens Christians to victimisation, but in a hostile world that responded to a loving Christ with the cross, perhaps taking this risk is part of what it means to live as a disciple of Christ.Rob Clements:
ANDREW and I may differ in our interpretation of violence, but we can likely both agree that the fetishism of violence is not a useful lens through which to view the cross. I am often struck by how the gospels do not seem to overplay the violence of the cross, macabre as that event would have been, as opposed to some contemporary depictions of the crucifixion which appear to salivate over its bloody violence. (I am mindful how quickly movies such as Mel Gibson’s The Passion of the Christ turn into theological torture porn for a desensitised generation.) I’m taken back to the preachers I heard in my younger years who repeatedly walked us step by step through the gruesome violence of the cross, perhaps in the hope that the more gruesome they made it, the more likely I would repent of my sins that put him there.Gremlins in the psyche
Modern psychology has taught us much about the gremlins that exist within the human psyche, our proclivity towards violence to self and other. I have a lurking fear that that violence is too easily projected onto our image of God, and I fear that the place where that is most likely and most dangerous is the cross. One of the challenges nonviolent atonement theory offers is a reminder that any theological use of violence needs to be constantly reflective if it is to avoid feeding our darkest pathologies. The area where traditional cross-centred interpretations and nonviolent models of the atonement have the greatest divergence is in the question of will, and within our discussion that is something that remains unresolved. Was Jesus’ death on the cross ‘God’s will’, or was it ‘our will’ to which God himself surrendered? Does the violence of the cross principally teach us something about God’s nature, or about human nature? By suggesting that the crucifixion principally tells us something about human nature, nonviolent atonement theologies have focused on the ethics of human behaviour. The cross reveals that we humans are the source and cause of violence, and through the grace of God we are invited into a new humanity reflective of the nonviolent reign of Christ. However, nonviolent theologies of atonement would do well to recognise that they do not have ownership over the ethical terrain. All too often nonviolent theologians have drifted towards group or tribal interpretations of the world that have been overly simplistic. Such have often been combative rather that conciliatory, mirroring the culture they seek to liberate. Too often a nonviolent theology of atonement has been a cold house for those with differing views. I have been encouraged by Andrew’s assertion that cross- centred atonement theories share similar ethical concerns. I see how the idea of the self-giving God is a gift across the theological spectrum. Recognising that we may not come to agreement on theological theory, it is not beyond imagining that we might seek common ground in practice.Andrew Campbell and Rob Clements:
THIS discussion has sought to include three particular views: those of nonviolent atonement theorists, and of each of ourselves. All three are distinct. Between ourselves we differ notably in our views of what the cross of Christ achieved, its role within God’s plan for atonement and the nature of violence. These are substantial and should not be under-estimated. Yet despite acknowledged differences the aim of this discussion is to find common ground and mutual learning in order to discover a richer understanding of the living work of Christ – a work that all three voices agree must include ethical engagement with the world around us and a corporate existence in the Church which Christ desires to be a reciprocal community of love and self-giving. What is significant for us is that the differences in our discussion exist on a philosophical level while the practical outworking appears to be similar. This is not to belittle those differences. Theology is important; and it provides a platform for the charitable disagreement required to further knowledge.* Full article available in printed copies.
Andrew Campbell and Rob Clements
Andrew Campbell is rector of Skerry in the diocese of Connor, Rob Clements is rector of Kiltiernan, diocese of Dublin.